[a] Cultural Capital RL |
Theoretical
Implications—1
Pierre
Bourdieu—Habitus, Praxis, Fields, and Cultural Capital
This essay has focused on the framing of
questions, not results as such. The question of “spending religiosity” grew out of my
ethnographic research, long after I returned from my most recent trip to the
mountains (I have taken a break for the last eighteen months that has been
devoted to writing, but I will return soon for more sustained research). I
would like to conclude by examining a number of theoretical perspectives that
could be of use in thinking more rigorously (and, indeed, widely) about matters
of divinatory economics.
I think that there are profound implications for the study of many aspects of social life all over the world. It is not difficult to see that religious life and spending connect on many levels, and not only on sacred mountains (I cannot help but think of brisk Sunday morning breakfast business all over the United States, geared to the “church rush” after services or mass). Saturday nights work in similar fashion, as do Friday afternoons all over the world. Although I am focusing on the “spending” of incense and hell money on one Chinese mountain, the implications—if we frame the questions well—could go far.
I think that there are profound implications for the study of many aspects of social life all over the world. It is not difficult to see that religious life and spending connect on many levels, and not only on sacred mountains (I cannot help but think of brisk Sunday morning breakfast business all over the United States, geared to the “church rush” after services or mass). Saturday nights work in similar fashion, as do Friday afternoons all over the world. Although I am focusing on the “spending” of incense and hell money on one Chinese mountain, the implications—if we frame the questions well—could go far.
[b] Think, ought, do RL |
As a reader of microeconomic theory and behavioral psychology, I am struck in quite negative ways by what I regard as the utter inability of many economists and psychologists to think “socially” or to avoid a kind of one-dimensional pseudo-objectivity. I take as my starting point for the study of divinatory calculation a statement that the anthropologist J.H.M. Beattie made over fifty years ago. “Anthropologists…study both what people do and what they think about what they do…[and the latter] are of (at least) two kinds; first, their notions about what they actually do, and, second, their beliefs about what they ought to do...
Nowhere has the range of these matters been
better articulated than by Pierre Bourdieu, whose entire theoretical framework
grew out of empirical challenges in his own research. Many of these details
were of a kind similar to what microeconomics and behavioral psychology
considers. Bourdieu’s greatest achievement, from my perspective, was in forever
destroying the smug certainty with which thinkers from Aristotle to Claude
Lévi-Strauss have spoken of the “rules” of human thought and behavior. To paraphrase
Bourdieu, there are no rules. It is
not even enough to say that rules are flexible and ever-changing. It might be
more accurate to describe them as a kind of grid upon which real life in the
present moment of choice “works itself out.”
[c] Early choice RL |
There is habitus—the
ingrained but still-changing ways of behaving with which we are enculturated.
On the mountain, habitus used to take
pilgrims through the temple in the cosmologically “correct” order. No more, at
least not at the southern mountain temple. It still has the vast majority of
pilgrims buying incense and hell money, paying respects (albeit “backwards”) at
the base temple, and repeating the process at the Zhurong Temple on the peak.
Most people, echoing Beattie, would describe these activities as what one
“ought” to do."
Where Bourdieu breaks new ground is in describing the way that people play rules or expectations off of each other, to the point that it really cannot be said that people follow rules at all. They, rather, act in accordance with their individual and social interests in a complex and ever-changing field of operation. For Bourdieu, it is not the individual actor that is the key to analysis (a mistake made by economists and psychologists alike); it is the relations between actors or groups within a system or, as he calls it, a “field.” The analysis of individual action (common in action theory and game theory) independently of the “fields” within which actors operate is meaningless. I would go so far as to say that economists and psychologists give a patina of “objectivity” to their work precisely to the extent that they ignore “fields,” which complicate matters to the point where elegant analyses will no longer fit.
Where Bourdieu breaks new ground is in describing the way that people play rules or expectations off of each other, to the point that it really cannot be said that people follow rules at all. They, rather, act in accordance with their individual and social interests in a complex and ever-changing field of operation. For Bourdieu, it is not the individual actor that is the key to analysis (a mistake made by economists and psychologists alike); it is the relations between actors or groups within a system or, as he calls it, a “field.” The analysis of individual action (common in action theory and game theory) independently of the “fields” within which actors operate is meaningless. I would go so far as to say that economists and psychologists give a patina of “objectivity” to their work precisely to the extent that they ignore “fields,” which complicate matters to the point where elegant analyses will no longer fit.
The knowledge that comes from Bourdieu’s
approach is textured and, like life, a little messy. I like to describe it this
way. There are no “rules,” only habits (habitus).
Connected to these are a rather imprecise set of expectations—senses of what
one “ought” to do in a particular situation. Add to that the reality of other
actors in motion around the individual (sometimes alongside and sometimes
competing in various ways) and, finally, the “fact” that the rewards people
seek from their investments of time, energy, and capital are never merely
economic. Voici, we have the complex
amalgam of operations at work on a pilgrimage mountain in China as well as a
Sunday morning breakfast rush at the Waffle House®. For Bourdieu,
actors are never static (a severe failing found in approaches as diverse as
neo-utilitarianism and structuralism). They are always active; they are always acting.
On Longevity Mountain, this approach works
well to provide interpretive solidity to a complex set of movements. Do we
enter from the “back” or walk around to the front of the base temple? Do we even
know that temples have “directions” in the way that most travelers would have
understood five centuries ago? What kind of incense do we use? How much of it?
What kind of it (how expensive)? And is anyone looking at my dragon head
incense sticks that cost ¥100? The questions continue. Where do we stay? How do
we plan to travel? How much does it cost? What is the relevance of the secular
features of the mountain (the Martyr’s Shrine to Nationalist heroes during the
war with Japan, a famous tea house, and the filming location for China’s most
popular television show)? What is the relevance of the temples along the route
between base and peak? Within any given temple, is there a sector (殿) that is more
worthy of attention than the others? If I “spend” incense at the “acquiring
wealth” sector of one temple, is it acceptable, perhaps, to diversify and move
to, say, the “gaining children” section of the next? Do particular temples have
particularly strong reputations for one or another kind of supplication?
The questions go on and on, and every time
that I have tried to graph them, I get an embarrassingly simplistic demand
curve that I attribute to my lack of doctoral level study in economics, but
suspect still to be a problem with…economics. Here again, Bourdieu is useful.
For him, all theoretical perspectives dealing with action are insufficient in
isolation. We are far too likely to take on the naïve view of the actor,
forgetting the crucial matter of actors’ positions in relation to one another
and to the field within which they move. Even on a mountain, numerous
structures (and other actors) impose constraints upon actors, many of which
they are completely unaware.
And, finally, it is all forever changing.
Always. Structures are made and continuously reproduced by actors. At the same
time, the continual reproduction is forever changing the structures themselves.
Even as, say, sacrificing at base and peak (as we have established) is grounded
as a continually replicated and reproduced habitus,
the journeys and particular sacrifices etch and re-etch the structure.
Reconsider the extremes with which we began. Both the hasty traveler and devout
kowtower reproduce the structural expectation of sacrificing at base and peak.
Both effect a very different kind of assumption (the “ought”), however. Now
imagine thousands of travelers every day replicating, reproducing, and
innovating.
We have the cultural economics of divination on China’s southern sacred mountain.
Finally, Bourdieu writes of “cultural capital.” To be sure, pilgrims spend sizable amounts of money on and around the mountains. Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital is a persistent one, though. A trip to Longevity Mountain most definitely increases this vague but important set of qualities for the traveler. Yet my own travels and research have shown me that, regardless of religious intensity, the utmost maximization of cultural capital comes not from a trip to Longevity Mountain, but rather on a trip (about two hours away) to Mao Zedong’s birthplace. In today’s China, that is the bragging right, so to speak. The southern mountain adds to the luster, but thirty centuries of cosmology is nowhere close to the prestige of a farmhouse from Mao’s boyhood. Ever-changing.
We have the cultural economics of divination on China’s southern sacred mountain.
Finally, Bourdieu writes of “cultural capital.” To be sure, pilgrims spend sizable amounts of money on and around the mountains. Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital is a persistent one, though. A trip to Longevity Mountain most definitely increases this vague but important set of qualities for the traveler. Yet my own travels and research have shown me that, regardless of religious intensity, the utmost maximization of cultural capital comes not from a trip to Longevity Mountain, but rather on a trip (about two hours away) to Mao Zedong’s birthplace. In today’s China, that is the bragging right, so to speak. The southern mountain adds to the luster, but thirty centuries of cosmology is nowhere close to the prestige of a farmhouse from Mao’s boyhood. Ever-changing.
NEXT
Theoretical Implications—2
We'll take a long look at Marshall Sahlins and his perspectives on structure and history tomorrow, as we delve ever-more-deeply into the science of divinatory economics.
Theoretical Implications—2
We'll take a long look at Marshall Sahlins and his perspectives on structure and history tomorrow, as we delve ever-more-deeply into the science of divinatory economics.
[f] Structure RL |
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