Asian Ethnicities (2b)—Japan ("Yamato")

A year ago on Round and Square (12 July 2011)—Baseball Middles: The All Star Game

Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" 

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3

[a] Nature RF

The first three entries (each in several segments) for the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" deal with the majority ethnic groups in China, Japan, and Korea. We are starting with these groups precisely because they permeate all of the nooks and crannies of their respective histories. Indeed, the history of China is often taught (and this is especially true in Chinese schools) as the history of the Han ethnicity. As we shall see, this is particularly problematic in China, since the history of China can better—this is my opinion—be taught as a constant set of interactions with ethnic groups to the west, south, and especially north. It is no less important in Japan and Korea, however. The relative homgeneity of those populations exacerbate the problems, and engagement with various ethnic groups tends to be even further marginalized. I hope to give, in these introductory posts, a way of thinking about majority ethnicity in China, Japan, and Korea. These are by no means my last word on the subject(s). As you can see from the introduction to this series, these are works in process and are meant to be essays in every sense of the term.

[b] Flourishing RF

Social and Economic Life 

By the tenth century, a distinct way of life had emerged on the islands of Japan. It represented a blending of institutions and cultural patterns from abroad, combined with a distinctly indigenous way of speaking and living. This can be seen even today in the Japanese language. There are "Chinese" (on) pronunciations and "Japanese" (kun) ones. It is not unusual for a single character to have three, four, five, or more "readings" that merge all sorts of earlier patterns, many of which have connections to Japan’s early history, with roots in the uji and Shinto religious practices of the early Common Era. 

The political changes that took place over the next millennium were formidable, but the key point for our purposes is that virtually all of the drama was played out between families and clans with Yamato ancestry. The major periods that followed the dramatic state building of the first millennium CE showed a continuing give-and-take between powers of the capital region and the strengths of the provinces further afield. Class distinctions were changing in profound ways, even as ethnicity hardly created a blip of difference beyond fervent borrowing from China.

The Heian (794-1185) saw both the flourishing of Japanese literary culture (the period was made famous by the Tale of Genji and other masterworks) and the centrality of the capital city in political matters. Behind the scenes, however, an overwhelming transition was taking place. The economic fuel that powered this ostensibly capital-centered political system was provided by the growing “estates” (shoen) that began dotting the countryside on the main island of Honshu since almost the time of Prince Shotoku. On the surface, then, the state seemed to be centralizing. The longer-term process would not be apparent for many years, but by the twelfth century it was clear that power had shifted decidedly to the periphery, along with a social structure that would dominate Japanese life until the nineteenth century.

[c] Dominance RF

Territorial strongmen and a kind of warrior that came to be known as bushi or samurai gained dominance, and the artificial but significant rankings of samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant (in descending order) became cemented in the Japanese consciousness. This social order so profoundly dominated Japanese life in the second millennium CE that all future political and military strategies until the 1860s would require a balancing of regional warlords and central authority. While Chinese society during the same period would see a constant negotiation and renegotiation of ethnicity— as “foreign” powers vied for ascendancy and Han Chinese occupied regions to the south and west—the Japanese historical dynamic played out almost exclusively within a singular ethnic group. In short, occupation dominated social thought far more than ethnicity in Japanese history; it was as though everyone was on the same large “team,” and the prizes were garnered by making distinctions within the in-group rather than in competition with outsiders. Like a Republican primary in Utah (or a Democratic one in Chicago), the real competition was within the dominant team.

Through it all, one further force of ethnic and national identity flowed as a cultural constant—the imperial family that was linked to the Sun Goddess from the earliest decades of the Yamato state. To this day, the Japanese imperial line is spoken of as an unbroken succession of 125 emperors, all of whom—in a secret ritual last carried out in 1989—“merged” with the Sun Goddess to achieve a kind of imperial immortality that has been used for purposes both peaceful and profoundly warlike over the centuries. Although the Showa Emperor renounced the divinity of the emperorship in 1945, it is significant that the ceremony was still carried out for the succession of his son in 1989. It is another small glimpse into early Yamato images of legitimacy and centrality in the political life of a formidable modern democracy.

[d] Identity RF

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3

Asian Ethnicities (2a)—Japan ("Yamato")

A year ago on Round and Square (11 July 2011)—Baseball MIddles: Catcher in the Fire

Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" 

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3 

[a] Heartland RF

The first three entries (each in several segments) for the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" deal with the majority ethnic groups in China, Japan, and Korea. We are starting with these groups precisely because they permeate all of the nooks and crannies of their respective histories. Indeed, the history of China is often taught (and this is especially true in Chinese schools) as the history of the Han ethnicity. As we shall see, this is particularly problematic in China, since the history of China can better—this is my opinion—be taught as a constant set of interactions with ethnic groups to the west, south, and especially north. It is no less important in Japan and Korea, however. The relative homgeneity of those populations exacerbate the problems, and engagement with various ethnic groups tends to be even further marginalized. I hope to give, in these introductory posts, a way of thinking about majority ethnicity in China, Japan, and Korea. These are by no means my last word on the subject(s). As you can see from the introduction to this series, these are works in process and are meant to be essays in every sense of the term.

Yamato 大和 

The people of Yamato dominate Japanese history, as well as almost all Japanese discussions of ethnicity. Using this term in the history of the dominant ethnic group in Japan is not without peril, especially since the concept of a kind of racial purity developed in the late-nineteenth century, distinguishing “Japanese” or “Yamato” from other ethnic groups on surrounding islands (the Ainu to the north, the Ryukuans to the south) and several others who made up the Japanese overseas empire during the Meiji (1865-1912) and later periods, up to the end of World War II. The term has been used both as a kind of self-identification for in-group as well as a sometimes fierce expression of disdain for those who were not its members. This negative strain has been shown in Japanese perceptions of Koreans and Taiwanese during Japan’s imperial period (1895-1945) and can be seen today with regard to treatment of Burakumin and other minority groups in Japan.

[b] Background RF

Although many ethnic groups have strong senses of identity that often contrast the in-group quite markedly with outer groups, there are historical and cultural reasons that this kind of sentiment has remained powerful throughout Japan’s history. Japan’s distinctive island setting and consistent interpretations of its cultural history have provided some of the background for these perceptions. 

The chief reason for the distinctive role of Japan in early East Asian history is its location—an island complex distant from Korea by over one hundred miles, and with even exploration of adjoining islands and ethnic groups occurring late recently in Japanese history. Unlike its East Asian neighbors, Korea and Vietnam, Japan was never invaded by Chinese armies. Chinese influences penetrated Japan more conspicuously than they did in Korea. They did not seep across a shared border but came rather came by ship. Political thinkers, writers, and religious figures consciously drew on Chinese tradition in a way that would have been impossible were the influence less obvious. As a major scholar, Edwin Reischauer, has noted:

       Early in their history the Japanese developed the habit of cataloguing foreign 
       influences and contrasting them with native characteristics. One result has 
       been a frequent emphasis in Japanese history on supposedly "native" 
       Japanese traits.

It is important to consider these matters from several perspectives that have ebbed and flowed throughout Japanese history. They are intertwined to the point of contradiction, but they go far toward understanding Japanese ethnic identity throughout history and even today. 
            [1] A tendency in Japan to see its history only in terms of native traits,

            and casting aside most everything borrowed as mere "icing." 

            [2] The opposite tendency, mostly by outsiders, to characterize Japan

            merely as a nation of borrowers who take from other countries and

            have few ideas of their own. 

[c] Groupings RF

Geography and History 
The Japan that emerged slowly into the Common Era was essentially a tribal society, very much like that of early Korea. It was divided into a great number of family groups called uji, each under a hereditary chief and worshipping an uji god, commonly thought of as its ancestor. Subordinate to these aristocratic uji were occupational groupings known as be, organized as agricultural communities or performing other services such as fishing, weaving, pottery making, and divining.

The Yamato state was probably in origin an uji with connections to the Sun Goddess, which would become a pivotal figure in Japanese history and identity over the next fifteen centuries. By the fifth century the Yamato had won a vague supremacy over the other uji groupings—classifying them as either "country vassals" or "attendant vassals," but preserving the idea that all were meant to serve the "main" line linked to the Sun Goddess.

By the sixth century the "Sun line" as many have called it, was expanding its own wealth and power at the expense of the local uji and subordinate be units. The growth of this ethnic group and the consolidation of a Japanese state were interwoven in large and small ways.

[d] Pattern RF

The growing strength and institutional complexity of the Yamato state were in part the result of continuing contacts with the continent, particularly Korea. There was a steady flow of people from Korea to Japan that lasted up until the early ninth century that tends to get downplayed when talk turns (as it inevitably must) to cultural influence from China. To underline the Korean influence, more than a third of aristocratic families listed in the early ninth century claimed Korean ancestry.

Among the many elements of continental civilization that came to Japan by way of Korea was Buddhism. Although its was assimilated gradually, its official introduction is dated to 552, when the Korean state of Paekche presented an image and scriptures to the Yamato court. The new religion was opposed by conservative groups, but was embraced by the Soga uji, which was to emerge victorious over its rivals in a great succession war in 587. Following this, the Soga firmly established Buddhism at court.

Yamato influence was cemented in the late-sixth and early-seventh centuries with several state-building measures meant to solidify their control. The victory of the Soga clan in 587 made them supreme at the Yamato court. Their chief put his niece on the throne and appointed her nephew, Prince Shotoku (574–622), regent. Shotoku and the Soga elders proceeded to carry out a series of innovations that were to shape Japanese society and government quite consciously on the pattern of China.

In 604 Shotoku issued a set of precepts known as the "Seventeen Article Constitution,” which advocated—in heavily Confucian rhetoric mixed with Buddhist strains—such ideas as the complete supremacy of the ruler, the centralization of government, and a bureaucracy staffed by a merit-selected group of officials. That same year Shotoku adopted the Chinese calendar. A few decades later the fascination with the Chinese calendar sparked an interest in a process of counting in cycles of sixty years, which Yamato thinkers used to solidify their argument for rule. They traced the cycle back twenty-one times for a total of 1,260 years, and selected the date of 660 BCE for the founding of the Japanese state and the first emperor, Jimmu.

[e] Transition RF

Perhaps most significantly, in 603 Shotoku adopted a major aspect of Chinese centralized bureaucratic rule—the system of personal court ranks for officials, assigned in accordance with the posts they held. These gradually replaced the uji ranks as the major designations of status. Although not nearly as large in scale as the Chinese system from which it was drawn, these markers gradually replaced the hereditary uji ranks as the major designations of status. This transition did as much to solidify Yamato influence in the Japanese state—with an influence that lasted many centuries—as any other.

After Shotoku's death, the Soga alienated the other court families by their despotic rule and were eventually crushed in 645 in a coup engineered by a prince, the future Emperor Tenchi (r. 668-671) and a supporter, who was rewarded with a new family name that was to resound in later ages—Fujiwara. As Fujiwara no Kamatari (614–669), he became the leader of a family that was to dominate the Japanese court for nearly five hundred years. Tenchi and Kamatari embarked on a second great wave of reforms based on the Chinese model of centralized government. Taika, meaning "Great Change," was borrowed from the Chinese predilection for reign titles, and the reforms that commenced in 645 and were carried out over the next several years.

A capital with Chinese–style buildings was erected at Naniwa (near present–day Osaka) at the eastern end of the Inland Sea; central government ministries were set up and efforts were made to establish uniform rule over the provinces and to institute the centralized Chinese system of taxation. A census was carried out toward this end in 670, and law codes of a Chinese type were drawn up. The reforms that took shape represented a set of pragmatic compromises between the new court, existing institutions, and the various uji that retained some power. Slowly the Japanese state—and the descendants of Yamato—began to be reshaped in the image of Tang China.

This adaptation is the key point in Yamato dominance in the Chinese state. They mastered the transition from small uji and be groups until—with one clan or another in the ascendant until modern times, and an unbroken line of “Sun-Goddess” emperors—the transition was made to a Chinese-style centralized state.

[f] Sun Godliness RF

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3

Fieldnotes From History (51)—Provincial Elections-l

Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Fieldnotes From History."
One year ago today on Round and Square (10 July 2011)—Hurtin' Country: Amarillo By Morning

[a] Alone RF

Click below for other fieldnotes dealing with Taiwan's 1985 provincial elections:
Election 1         Election 2          Election 3          Election 4          Election 5          Election 6
Election 7         Election 8          Election 9          Election 10        Election 11        Election 12

 Part of an occasional Round and Square series that follows the blog’s main theme (east meets west, round meets square, and past meets present), these snippets from my early fieldnotes are reproduced as they were written by hand—and then revised on an ancient desktop computer—during my first fieldwork stay in Taiwan (1985-1987).  All entries are the way that I left them when I returned to the United States in 1987—some nicely-stated and some embarrassing. Although the series began with my assumption that the entries can stand alone, I have found that separate comments and notes might help readers understand a world that is now, well, history. These are always separate from the original fieldnote.

The next several dozen entries in this series represent my memories—in the form of fieldnotes that were already well on their way to being letters—of Taiwan's provincial elections in November 1985. I had taken down what I call "jottings" at the time, and "now," two months later, I was ready to get a little bit more detail down in the form of fieldnotes. If you are somewhat unfamiliar with the five-stage process that framed my work habits even back then, it might be worth a quick look at the introduction to this series. Suffice to say here that in Taiwan in 1985 I was working from "jottings" to "fieldnotes" most of the time. Every month or so, I would write a letter that made it all into a more sustained narrative. Even early on, I realized how powerfully the knowledge that I would be writing letters influenced my fieldnotes. You may see it, too. It has remained my method to this day.

[b] Outside RF

Like many fieldnotes, these were "written up" (a term I dislike, but am occasionally willing to use) after the fact. I wonder if most students of anthropology know how common this is. The implications for research, eye-witness authenticity, and historiography are numerous. It is a reality that has never gone away for field researchers of all kinds, though, and I suspect that it never will. 

Comment 

So the Nationalists won. In retrospect, I think that they did so in more ways than one. The 1985 elections—while a very small potato in the spud field of even political life on Taiwan—were the first in a series of "openings" that have profoundly changed political culture on the island. More elections followed, and the opposition candidates, known in 1985 as "outside the party" (黨外 ;dangwai), would soon become an actual party...and would eventually capture the presidency. This did not go particularly smoothly, but it is hard to dispute the reality of a vibrant multiple-party system today. This started in the 1980s, and I was lucky enough to see some of it in action. 

Notes 

[1] Readers under, say, the age of ninety might need a refresher on the New York City Democratic political machine. Tammany Hall knew how to get out the vote, and my reference was not alone. Although it is difficult (and obscure) to refer to "Tammany Hall" in Chinese, the idea is a powerful one, even half a world away. 

[2] Remember, the opposition candidates were on their own in 1985. It was like having a U.S. Senate race with an incumbent running against a self-funded candidate without a party affiliation. Unless you spend a little time "watching" politics, this may not seem like a big deal. It is. A well-funded incumbent party has advantages large and small against even wealthy people who are not allowed to ally with others. This would change in just a few years, but in 1985 it was the Globetrotters against the Washington Generals.

[c] Watching RF

[3] Long term systemic change was in the works, but it was not obvious in 1985. I was quite cynical then (some of this can be seen in the note below). I would characterize things in rather laudatory ways now, twenty-seven years later. 

16 February 1986 

Taipei 

Despite the national and international overtones, however, local elections centered, for the most part, on local issues: garbage collection, parking spaces, street vendors, and traffic. The outcome hinged on the perception of the Guomindang by the public, as well as the effectiveness of the “Guomindang Machine," which operates like an eastern Tammany Hall when it comes to getting out the vote. The opposition candidates have no recourse to “machine” politics, since they are barred from banding together in cooperative efforts. 

Dangwai candidates, however, have a reputation for propaganda ability. They have brought movie stars into the campaigns, distributed handbills, and launched a “cartoon offensive," an attempt to gain popular appeal. As the campaign drew to a close, the Guomindang was beginning, reluctantly to accept the necessity of “playing the election game.”  They too joined in, distributed handbills, and sought personality endorsements. 

In the end, despite the scandals and the recession, the Guomindang did make a strong showing. Although opposition candidates made some inroads in Taipei, Guomindang candidates won thirty-eight out of fifty-one Taipei City Council seats, and seventeen out of twenty-one mayoral races. The provincial assembly elections followed the same pattern. All together, Guomindang candidates won seventy percent of the seats. 

[d] Buds RF

Click below for other fieldnotes dealing with Taiwan's 1985 provincial elections:
Election 1         Election 2          Election 3          Election 4          Election 5          Election 6
Election 7         Election 8          Election 9          Election 10        Election 11        Election 12

Fieldnotes From History (50)—Provincial Elections-k

Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Fieldnotes From History."
One year ago today on Round and Square (9 July 2011)—Le Tour de la France: André Makes a Map

[a] Borders RF

Click below for other fieldnotes dealing with Taiwan's 1985 provincial elections:
Election 1         Election 2          Election 3          Election 4          Election 5          Election 6
Election 7         Election 8          Election 9          Election 10        Election 11        Election 12

Part of an occasional Round and Square series that follows the blog’s main theme (east meets west, round meets square, and past meets present), these snippets from my early fieldnotes are reproduced as they were written by hand—and then revised on an ancient desktop computer—during my first fieldwork stay in Taiwan (1985-1987).  All entries are the way that I left them when I returned to the United States in 1987—some nicely-stated and some embarrassing. Although the series began with my assumption that the entries can stand alone, I have found that separate comments and notes might help readers understand a world that is now, well, history. These are always separate from the original fieldnote.

The next several dozen entries in this series represent my memories—in the form of fieldnotes that were already well on their way to being letters—of Taiwan's provincial elections in November 1985. I had taken down what I call "jottings" at the time, and "now," two months later, I was ready to get a little bit more detail down in the form of fieldnotes. If you are somewhat unfamiliar with the five-stage process that framed my work habits even back then, it might be worth a quick look at the introduction to this series. Suffice to say here that in Taiwan in 1985 I was working from "jottings" to "fieldnotes" most of the time. Every month or so, I would write a letter that made it all into a more sustained narrative. Even early on, I realized how powerfully the knowledge that I would be writing letters influenced my fieldnotes. You may see it, too. It has remained my method to this day.

Like many fieldnotes, these were "written up" (a term I dislike, but am occasionally willing to use) after the fact. I wonder if most students of anthropology know how common this is. The implications for research, eye-witness authenticity, and historiography are numerous. It is a reality that has never gone away for field researchers of all kinds, though, and I suspect that it never will.

[b] Telling RF

Comment

This is a background note, and a pretty thorough one, if I do say so myself. In just three paragraphs, it reminds "the reader" (with fieldnotes, that is usually an audience of one) of the events behind the story of the vote itself. In this case, a recession and several scandals appeared prominently in the opposition narrative. The Nationalists stressed continuity and prosperity. Although these posts are not literary events, to be sure, I will work for a little suspence and wait until tomorrow to "tell" how the election came out. You could probably guess accurately right now.

In terms of fieldnote writing, two things come to mind here. First, it is probably just about right in terms of length. Much more, and it would become something beyond a reminder of context and background. That would have been fine but, at the least, it would have to be broken down into manageable chunks to work for me. This is another reminder about the rhetoric of fieldnotes, though. Even these little multiple-paragraph chunks of reflection become something of a mini-genre as we work. In this case, the notes are "about" the election and how it played out rather than the events "behind" it. In other words, I had a hazy narrative goal as I worked those afternoons (February 15-16, 1986), and there is no way that the results amount to anything different from "authorial creation." Attention people who flirt with "objectivism": get over it. They're written.

[c] Written RF

And that leads to one more observation that diligent readers of this series will already know. First, I jot(ted). These little things went (and continue to go) into notebooks, scraps of paper, and so forth. Sometimes I have even used a digital recorder....or even a cassette one (back in the day). Jottings led (and lead) to fieldnotes. I almost never got around to writing them in a "same day" fashion. This bothered me then and it concerns me now. Most are written in the kinds of "write up" flurries that occur when I had (or have) time. The next step—requiring more distance and more time—was writing letters. This is the key "middle" stage (lectures and essays are steps four and five in the process, and occur(ed) much later. My point is that I can sense, powerfully sense, the early creation of letters—a sort of rooting-around-for-an-audience rhetoric—in these notes. I have grown so used to this little fact of the process for me that I tend to take it for granted. When other fieldworkers who work in other ways see these, they often remark (with suspicion) that these look like letters. My reply is "absolutely," and it is because of the very writing process I have developed...for better or worse. 

Notes 
[1] "Tomorrow will be better" was the slogan but, as the fieldnote mentions, the Nationalists campaigned on thirty years of growth. It was a long-view strategy that more-or-less asked the electorate to give the ruling party credit for enormous changes over the decades.

[d] Discourse RF

[2] The Henry Liu murder was the big, nasty news item of the year leading up to the campaign. Of course, one would never hear it mentioned on the news, and people were even a little wary of talking about it with me. I raised the topic in a polite and inconspicuous manner with several people (anthropologists used to call them "informants"), and in every case there was evasion, discomfort, and no real discussion. A few months after writing this note

[3] The Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal was easier to talk about. It had just happened, and it was far more possible to talk about "bad eggs" (壞蛋) in the financial industry than government-sponsored murder on foreign soil. Political discourse is funny that way. 

16 February 1986
Taipei   
The Guomindang, using the slogan “Tomorrow will be better,” campaigned on the Republic of China’s GNP—one of the highest in Asia. They also campaigned on the theme of thirty years of growth, which has raised virtually everyone’s standard of living. Because the Republic of China has been experiencing a recession, however, opposition candidates campaigned on the recession and the government’s two major scandals last year. These scandals damaged the Republic of China’s international reputation and the Guomindang’s domestic standing, to the point that Guomindang officials were clearly worried about an embarrassing election.

One scandal, the Henry Liu murder in California, resulted in the prosecution of several high-ranking Republic of China intelligence officials. Liu was a California-based expatriate from Taiwan who wrote articles critical of the government. The Guomindang claimed that it had nothing to do with the murders, but was placed in the difficult position of prosecuting high officials without implicating others. Secondly, the failure of the Tenth Credit Cooperative, the Republic of China’s biggest financial breakdown in history, and the result of a very shady loan scheme run by its chief executive officer, damaged the internal credibility of government-operated financial institutions.

The Guomindang stressed the “big picture” and tried to deflect interest on the events of the previous year. The party argued that the country’s overall development from 1949 to the present was the important point, and all other criticisms were minor compared to the prosperity of Taiwan under Guomindang rule. The rhetorical arguments centered on economics and political freedoms, with the dangwai opposition stressing the recession and lack of political participation in the country.

[e] Backlook RF

Click below for other fieldnotes dealing with Taiwan's 1985 provincial elections:
Election 1         Election 2          Election 3          Election 4          Election 5          Election 6
Election 7         Election 8          Election 9          Election 10        Election 11        Election 12

Asian Ethnicities (1c)—Han 漢族

A year ago on Round and Square (8 July 2011)—Le Tour de la France: Disappointment and Perseverance

Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" 

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3

[a] Unearthed RF

The first three entries (each in several segments) for the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" deal with the majority ethnic groups in China, Japan, and Korea. We are starting with these groups precisely because they permeate all of the nooks and crannies of their respective histories. Indeed, the history of China is often taught (and this is especially true in Chinese schools) as the history of the Han ethnicity. As we shall see, this is particularly problematic in China, since the history of China can better—this is my opinion—be taught as a constant set of interactions with ethnic groups to the west, south, and especially north. It is no less important in Japan and Korea, however. The relative homgeneity of those populations exacerbate the problems, and engagement with various ethnic groups tends to be even further marginalized. I hope to give, in these introductory posts, a way of thinking about majority ethnicity in China, Japan, and Korea. These are by no means my last word on the subject(s). As you can see from the introduction to this series, these are works in process and are meant to be essays in every sense of the term.

[b] Classic RF

Cultural Life  

Anyone fortunate to visit both the Shanghai Municipal Museum and the National Palace Museum outside of Taipei, Taiwan, surely has noted a great contrast. The difference between the two has a great deal to do with the way that we view Han ethnicity in China. The items one sees in Taipei’s National Palace Museum form the core of what most of us know as “Chinese culture.” Room upon room showcases scrolls filled with paintings and calligraphy—a plethora of writing from almost every period of Chinese history—as well as beautifully crafted furniture, lacquer ware, vases, and the like. The collections in the National Palace Museum have been lovingly preserved, in many cases over the entire length of China’s imperial history, two-thousand years.

A visit to the Shanghai Museum has a different, less refined, feel to it. There are coins, official seals, pots, urns, and sacrificial vessels. Most of the items on display have been recently unearthed. The pieces in the Shanghai Museum are newer—in that they were just recently discovered—and yet are in some cases the oldest known artifacts that deal with the history of China. Though it is not apparent at first, if one stands back, physically and intellectually, the difference between the two museums becomes clear. One shows a China represented in its written history and showing the powerful dominance of Han “authorship.” The other represents materials that have been buried for much of the past two millennia, and presents a surprisingly diverse ethnic heritage.

[c] Northern scene RF

This historical dimension, as well as the artifacts themselves, shows a much more ambiguous picture of Han ethnic dominance in China than we normally see in textbooks. For example, archaeological digs in southern China such as the Mawangdui excavations in the 1970s, provide a picture of southern religious, social, and economic life that had not yet been penetrated by intermarriage, even as major texts of Chinese culture were being copied and modified. This should be a lesson for anyone seeking to understand China through its ethnic groups. The narrative should always be one of conflict and assimilation, and we err when we assume the history of China to be the history of the Han ethnic group.

But what of Han culture? How was it shown over the course of two millennia of imperial history? Perhaps the most important form can be seen in the governmental institutions themselves. There is an old saying in China that to lead a family and to lead “all under heaven” require the same key skills. The good father has all the qualities of a good leader. This is as powerful an example of Han patriarchy shaping social and cultural institutions as can be imagined. From there, the formative power of the written language carried enormous sway in the molding of Han Chinese identity. The very governmental apparatus that forged a centralized government carried the seeds of a unified written language (which ethnic minorities were often prevailed upon to master if they were to stay on relatively even footing) and a bureaucracy that stretched into every county of the Chinese territory. Those bureaucratic posts, in turn, sent Han Chinese to virtually every corner of the country, leading to further adaptation, intermarriage, and assimilation.

[d] Chinese RF

The educational system—and the vast network of examinations that were the keys to individual and family (as well as clan and lineage) success—was a further result of this very centralization. In turn, the very nature of the examination materials produced a kind of service ideal that would affect almost all aspects of family life. For example, the best avenue to success over several generations for a member of a non-Han ethnic group would often be to gain commercial success, generating sizable amounts of family resources. These could be used to gain marriage alliances that might not otherwise be possible, followed by a plan for a second and third generation to achieve more traditional kinds of success through the examination system and holding of official office. Indeed, it is not unusual to see this very pattern playing out today in China’s north, southwest, and especially its far western provinces.

***  ***

The history of the Han ethnic group is interwoven with the history of China as a whole. There is virtually no part of the story in which Han peoples do not play a role—and often a significant one. It is equally impossible to give a fair estimation of China’s past without understanding the profound dynamics of conflict, cooperation, assimilation, intermarriage, and cooptation that have taken place in China for as long as we have written or archaeological evidence. The Han story is one of engagement, and the ongoing give-and-take with other ethnic groups can bee seen even today, as new eras of China’s history unfold.

[e] Center/periphery RF

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

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Asian Ethnicities (1b)—Han 漢族

A year ago on Round and Square (7 July 2011)—Middles: T.S. Eliot's "Marina" 
Click here for the introduction to the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" 

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3

[a] Social RF

The first three entries (each in several segments) for the Round and Square series "Asian Ethnicities" deal with the majority ethnic groups in China, Japan, and Korea. We are starting with these groups precisely because they permeate all of the nooks and crannies of their respective histories. Indeed, the history of China is often taught (and this is especially true in Chinese schools) as the history of the Han ethnicity. As we shall see, this is particularly problematic in China, since the history of China can better—this is my opinion—be taught as a constant set of interactions with ethnic groups to the west, south, and especially north. It is no less important in Japan and Korea, however. The relative homgeneity of those populations exacerbate the problems, and engagement with various ethnic groups tends to be even further marginalized. I hope to give, in these introductory posts, a way of thinking about majority ethnicity in China, Japan, and Korea. These are by no means my last word on the subject(s). As you can see from the introduction to this series, these are works in process and are meant to be essays in every sense of the term. 

Social and Economic Life 
Han social life is dominated by patrilineage. Although shady accounts of early Chinese history hint at matriarchal relations, patrilineality (reckoning kinship through the family of the father) has been the clear kinship pattern for well over three millennia. Anthropologists emphasize the importance of the marriage alliance in understanding kinship, gender, and family issues in all societies.  Men and women do not live in a vacuum when they interact, but rather function within a complex network of social forces that provide them with opportunities, in some cases, and restricted social movement in others.  At its most basic level, marriage is a way to diversify the social fabric, and in China (as in many societies) the movement of women between families was the social lubricant that kept traditional society moving.   

[b] Exchange RF

The overwhelming importance of these exchanges among and between ethnic groups cannot be overemphasized. The only way to create real integration and continuing social regeneration is through exchange, and this is precisely why marriage lies at the very heart of the social order.  From the perspective of most scholars of marriage, it is not merely a useful social practice.  It is absolutely necessary at all levels of the social order.  Exchange of women (for—even though men could theoretically be exchanged just as easily—that is what it became in most early societies) creates one kind of social integration.  The practices that lead to that integration are not without conflict by any means, but there is in the case of marriage a biological price to pay for keeping kinship systems closed.  Many social theorists stress that the social cost is almost as great.

The way that such exchange takes place—generation after generation for over three thousand years of written records—has everything to do with the history of ethnicity in China. The Han ethnic group came to dominate, in part, because of strategic intermarrying and the strength of sheer numbers. Over the course of many centuries, practices of exogamy (marrying beyond one’s group) combined with patrilineal organization to give sizable advantages to the Han ethnicity. When Han men married women from other ethnic groups, the children would belong to the Han man’s family line. Multiply that process by many thousands of cases and carry it over twenty or more centuries, and the impact is profound.

[c] Wedding (c.1912) RF

This process can perhaps most clearly be seen in the Han ethnic concentration on Taiwan, which provides a concentrated picture of the processes related above. Although some migration took place as early as the Song dynasty (960-1279), the vast bulk of movement from the Chinese mainland began in the seventeenth century. In fewer than five hundred years, the Han ethnicity has become dominant one on the island—an island that consisted almost entirely of indigenous ethnic groups in 1600—and various studies have shown that the result of just five centuries of assimilation and intermarriage has led to significant percentages of the population with mixed Han Chinese and aboriginal bloodlines.

***  ***

They agricultural heartland of China, and the central homeland of Han Chinese economic life, was the Yellow River valley in northern China. For this reason, there is a strong focus on agriculture as a hallmark of Han identity to this day. An angry poem of the eleventh century catches this sentiment powerfully when the writer notes, “our land of sage kings [and masters of agriculture]…has been overrun by hordes of goats and sheep.” The author is perplexed by the changes wrought by northern pastoral groups who had invaded his home territory and used what would have been grain fields for grazing.

[d] Change RF

By extension, and also in response to these incursions, Chinese history is filled with waves of Han Chinese moving southward. What was once a wet and marshy set of lowlands in southeastern China became, by the second millennium of the imperial era, the greatest generator of economic growth in world history to that time. Innovations in rice-growing technology and the practice called double cropping led to one of the most powerful expansions the world had seen. Again, this story is often told in a way that gives credit to the Han migrants, and there is little doubt that the enormous power of the imperial state played a role in spurring economic growth. On the other hand, the very clearing of territories that were seen in Confucius’s day as dark, backward, and miasmatic—a world of fish and turtles, as one northern critic noted—became in several centuries the home of cities with over a million inhabitants and trade by land, sea, and canal that sustained the state and created fabulous wealth.

Han Chinese were the major beneficiaries of this transformation, but it was “collaborative” in ways that historians are only beginning to understand deeply.  Again, this can best be seen in more recent transformations of regions that have had stable ethnic identities for some time. Today’s clashes in the far-west call to mind those a millennium or more earlier in China’s southeast and southwest, when a powerful ethnic group linked to an enormous centralized state began to move in. 

[e] Alliances RF

Click here for other posts dealing with East Asian ethnic majorities:  

China 1       China 2       China 3       Japan 1       Japan 2       Japan 3       Korea 1       Korea 2       Korea 3